Islamic Republic of Iran
Islamic Republic of Iran
Regional threat; ballistic missile and proxy network concern
Source: SIPRI / IISS / CRS
Iran poses a significant regional threat through its ballistic missile programme, proxy networks (Hezbollah, Houthis, Iraqi PMF), and expanding drone capabilities. Iran's nuclear programme remains a major proliferation concern. It provides weapons and technology to Russia for use in Ukraine while using off-budget channels to sustain missile and drone programmes despite economic pressure.
Iran's advanced ballistic missile arsenal and large drone inventory remain the most significant direct military threat in the Middle East. Institute for Science and International Security analysis of the May 2025 IAEA report assessed Iran could convert its 60% enriched uranium stock into weapon-grade uranium for multiple weapons within weeks, while SIPRI assessed official 2025 military expenditure at $7.4bn and cautioned that off-budget oil revenues likely understate true military funding.
Khomeinist revolutionary ideology frames Iran's identity as the vanguard of Islamic resistance against Western imperialism and Zionism. The nuclear programme is simultaneously a deterrent capability, a source of regional prestige, and a political instrument for domestic legitimacy. Regime survival is the overriding calculus behind all strategic decisions.
Dominant power position in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen through proxy control. Permanent deterrence of Israeli military action. Prevention of Saudi regional leadership and Abraham Accords normalisation. Control over the Strait of Hormuz as a strategic chokepoint (20% of global oil transit).
Largest ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East. Shahab, Emad, Khorramshahr, Kheibar Shekan variants. Range up to 2,000+ km.
Shahed-136 (loitering munition) supplied to Russia. Mohajer, Shahed families. Significant export activity.
Hezbollah (Lebanon), Houthis (Yemen), PMF (Iraq), Hamas (Gaza). Strategic depth across the region.
Active state cyber capability. Destructive attacks on regional infrastructure. Espionage against Western targets.
Large but aging conventional military. Limited ability to project power beyond the region. IRGC as parallel force.
Uranium enriched to 60%. May 2025 IAEA/ISIS analysis assessed enough 60% HEU feedstock for multiple weapons if further enriched. No confirmed weapon yet.
| System | Type | Range | Payload | Guidance | CEP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fateh-110 / Dezful / Zolfaghar | Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) | 300–700 km | 450–500 kg | INS + GPS, terminal optical (Zolfaghar) | 5–10 m |
| Shahab-3 / Ghadr-110 / Emad | Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) | 1,300–2,000 km | 760–800 kg | Inertial (Shahab-3) → GPS-aided (Ghadr) → MaRV (Emad) | ~300 m (Shahab-3), ~30 m (Ghadr), improved (Emad) |
| Khorramshahr-4 (Qadr) | Medium-range ballistic missile | ~2,000 km | Classified | Advanced inertial + terminal manoeuvring | Claimed improved over Ghadr |
| Fattah-1 (claimed hypersonic) | Hypersonic glide vehicle (claimed) | ~1,400 km | Classified | Manoeuvring re-entry vehicle | Classified |
Exported to Russia (Geranium-2), Houthis, and Hezbollah. 40 kg shaped charge warhead. Distinctive delta-wing, low-altitude flight profile. 50 cc engine audible at night ("moped drone").
Larger, higher-capability MALE. Less proven in combat than Shahed-136. Claimed to carry air-to-surface missiles.
More capable than commercial-class but significantly below MALE tier. Qaem-1 and Qaem-5 PGM variants.
Large warhead. Reportedly used in Houthi Red Sea campaign as anti-radar weapon. Designed to saturate and suppress IADS.
Range 170 km; sea-skimming terminal; active radar homing. Transferred to Hezbollah (struck INS Hanit 2006)
Primary surface-launched anti-ship weapon. Deployed on frigates, fast attack craft, and coastal batteries.
Swarm tactics; torpedo launch; suicide boat capability; harassment of tanker traffic in Hormuz
Iran's primary naval doctrine relies on asymmetric saturation — hundreds of FAC vs. small number of high-value Coalition ships.
Torpedo and mine-laying capability in Hormuz and Persian Gulf
Small, hard to track in shallow Hormuz waters. ~12+ in service.
Est. 3,000+ mines; can mine Hormuz approaches in days; virtually impossible to clear quickly
Iran's single most cost-effective naval deterrent. Hormuz mining would immediately spike global oil prices.
Active GPS jamming in Strait of Hormuz area disrupting commercial shipping navigation (documented incidents). Limited tactical EW capability compared to Russia/China. Primarily sourced from Russian and Chinese technology transfers.
IRGC intelligence directorate operates extensive HUMINT networks in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Gulf states. Electronic intercept capability enhanced by Russian cooperation. Cyber capabilities (see APT33/Charming Kitten) partially compensate for physical EW gaps.
GPS jamming (Hormuz/Persian Gulf), Iranian-developed IFF spoofing capability, cyber operations against SCADA/industrial control systems (Shamoon-type attacks on Saudi Aramco). Assessment: limited traditional EW capability, but asymmetric cyber and GPS jamming capacity meaningful.
Iran launched Operation True Promise — first-ever direct strike on Israel from Iranian territory. ~170 Shahed-136 UAVs, 120+ ballistic missiles, 30+ cruise missiles. ~99% intercepted by Israeli/US/Jordanian/Saudi systems. Demonstrated capability but also limitations.
Operation True Promise 2 — second direct strike on Israel, ~180 ballistic missiles including Fattah-1 claimed hypersonic glide vehicles. More sophisticated than April. Israel responded with strikes on Isfahan air defence radars.
Hezbollah ceasefire and HTS seizure of Syria critically disrupted the primary Iran-Lebanon weapons supply corridor (Damascus highway). IRGC Quds Force lost key Syrian basing and transit infrastructure.
IAEA confirmed Iran has accumulated ~10 kg of 60%-enriched uranium — sufficient for approximately one nuclear device if enriched further to weapons grade. Breakout timeline assessed at ~1–2 weeks for a device.
IRGC Quds Force increased weapons and financial support to Houthis following Gaza Phase 1 ceasefire, redirecting proxy resources from Lebanon to Yemen as primary active campaign.
Iranian President Pezeshkian and Supreme Leader Khamenei signalled openness to nuclear diplomacy with indirect US contacts via Oman channel — assessed as tactical delay rather than strategic concession.
IAEA reported severe damage at Natanz and damage at Esfahan after attacks on Iranian nuclear sites, while emphasizing the need to verify more than 400 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235.
Iran will calibrate proxy activity around Gaza ceasefire dynamics. Nuclear enrichment will continue while using diplomatic engagement as a delaying mechanism. IRGC cyber operations against Israeli and Gulf state infrastructure will persist as a sub-threshold option. Houthis will remain the primary active proxy in the near term.
Iran faces a strategic inflection: proxies severely degraded, nuclear programme at threshold, and Israeli preventive strike risk elevated. Tehran may accelerate weapons-grade enrichment to achieve a deterrent fait accompli before a preventive strike becomes inevitable. Risk of Israeli strike on nuclear facilities is the single highest-probability escalation scenario in the region.
: Maintain nuclear ambiguity while proxies rebuild — buy time through diplomacy while advancing enrichment.
is perceived — breakout as deterrence.
COA 3: Use Houthi Red Sea campaign as primary active tool to maintain relevance and pressure on Israel while Lebanon axis recovers.
Khamenei aging (85), no clear succession mechanism. IRGC increasingly dominant over conventional military and civil government. Hardliner control strengthened after 2024 elections. Women Life Freedom movement legacy created unresolved social fracture. Political legitimacy increasingly dependent on nuclear programme and proxy resistance narrative.
Dual structure: IRGC (dominant, controls missiles/nuclear/proxies) and Artesh (conventional). IRGC Quds Force provides command and logistics to the Axis of Resistance. Direct military capability severely constrained by decades of sanctions on conventional equipment. Asymmetric and missile forces are the effective military instrument.
Significant sanctions pressure — ~40% inflation, ~$340Bn GDP (PPP). Oil exports partially recovered via China shadow fleet. Economy structurally adapted to sanctions but stagnating. Brain drain accelerating. IMF growth forecast below 3%.
Young, educated, and increasingly alienated population. Brain drain continues. Deep traditional religious constituency in rural/working-class communities. Women Life Freedom movement demonstrated scale of urban discontent but was suppressed. Ethnic minority pressures (Kurds, Baloch) ongoing.
IRIB state media controls domestic narrative. Active cyber information operations against Israel (Predatory Sparrow industrial sabotage), Saudi Arabia, and US. Persian-language social media influence operations. Al-Alam Arabic-language TV for regional audience.
Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan nuclear sites are both critical assets and primary vulnerabilities. Oil infrastructure critical economic node. Road/rail networks expanded specifically for proxy weapons resupply routes (Iraq corridor). Strait of Hormuz naval presence maintained as strategic lever.
Mountainous interior provides natural defensive depth against ground invasion. Zagros and Alborz ranges channel any land approach. Control of Strait of Hormuz (minimum 33 km width) is Iran's most powerful strategic leverage point — interdiction would immediately spike global oil prices.
Time is critical for Iran on the nuclear question — each week brings it closer to threshold capability. Every kilogram of enriched uranium is a deterrent increment. Conversely, time is running out before Israel or the US feels compelled to strike. The nuclear programme creates a race condition.
Proxy network providing strategic depth, geographic extension, and plausible deniability — Hezbollah, Houthis, Iraqi Shia factions, Hamas (degraded). Enables power projection without direct conventional military risk.
IRGC Quds Force provides command, financing, weapons, and training to entire Axis of Resistance. Unit 400 (Quds Force) specifically manages Hezbollah. Strategic direction from Tehran; proxies have operational autonomy but not strategic independence. Supreme Leader retains final authority over major escalation decisions.
Iran's strategy projects deterrence forward through proxy forces rather than conventional defence. The IRGC maintains permanent presence in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, creating a deterrence cordon at maximum range from Iranian territory. The Axis of Resistance keeps adversaries occupied far from Iran's borders. Direct Iranian military power is reserved for escalatory retaliation against existential threats.
Hormuz sea denial via IRGCN swarm boats, coastal Fateh-110 batteries, C-802/Noor anti-ship missiles, and mine-laying capability. Bavar-373 and S-300PMU-2 layered air defence covering Tehran and nuclear facilities. Distributed underground missile bases hardened to survive pre-emptive strikes.
Iran presents a NATO Southern flank challenge through proxy network destabilisation, potential nuclear breakout threatening the non-proliferation order, Hormuz energy chokepoint control, and threat to partner Israel. A nuclear-armed Iran would fundamentally alter extended deterrence requirements across the entire region.
Medium-range ballistic missile. Solid fuel, 2,000 km range. Solid fuel gives rapid launch capability.
Loitering munition supplied to Russia in large numbers. Jet-powered variant (238) in development. Low cost, high volume.
Uranium enriched to 60% at Fordow and Natanz. Significant stockpile accumulated. IAEA monitoring degraded.
Russia and Iran signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty in January 2025 that formalised their deepening military relationship. The treaty included provisions for military-technical cooperation, joint exercises, and arms transfers. The agreement followed the Shahed drone deal and marked the most significant Russia-Iran defence alignment since the Soviet era. Western analysts assessed the partnership as a mutual arms supply arrangement: Iran provides drones and missiles, Russia provides advanced military technology, fighter aircraft (pending), and attack helicopters.
Iran continues to supply the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah) with ballistic missile components, Shahed-136-derived loitering munitions, Quds-1 cruise missiles, and anti-ship weapons via Yemen's western coastline. UN Panel of Experts reports (S/2023/833 and subsequent) confirm Iranian-origin components in recovered Houthi munitions including propellant chemistry, guidance electronics, and structural materials. The supply chain enables Houthi operations against Red Sea shipping and Israel despite international naval interception efforts.
Iran's 'precision missile project' for Hezbollah has continued despite Israeli interdiction strikes on Syrian transfer routes. The programme aims to supply Hezbollah with GPS/optically-guided variants of the Fateh-110 (M-600), Zolfaghar, and possibly Kheibar Shekan class missiles with sub-50m CEP. Israeli intelligence assessed pre-2024 Hezbollah stock at 5,000+ precision-guided missiles before Israeli interdiction operations degraded this inventory during the September–October 2024 campaign. Iran continues efforts to replenish stocks.
Multiple reports from mid-2023 indicated Russia and Iran were finalising a deal for Mi-28NE (export) attack helicopters. The Mi-28NE would provide Iran with a modern all-weather attack rotary-wing platform superior to its existing AH-1J Cobra fleet. The deal has not been officially confirmed by either government. If delivered, the Mi-28NE would significantly augment Iranian Army Aviation close air support capability, particularly given Iran's near-zero capacity to acquire Western platforms.
Multiple reports from 2022–2023 indicated Iran and Russia had agreed in principle to supply Iran with Su-35S multirole fighters, replacing some of Iran's ageing IRIAF fleet. Russian press and Western intelligence assessments indicated preliminary agreement, but confirmed delivery has not been verified by mid-2025. Russia may be reluctant to transfer its most capable export fighter amid VKS attrition in Ukraine. If delivered, Su-35S would represent a transformational improvement over Iran's current fleet of degraded F-14As and MiG-29s.
Iran supplied Russia with Shahed-136 loitering munitions beginning in mid-2022, which Russia designated Geran-2. Over 2,400 units are assessed as having been delivered by end-2023, with a domestic Russian production line subsequently established at Alabuga. Iran also delivered the faster jet-powered Shahed-238 variant to Russia in 2024. UK, US, and EU officials confirmed the transfers and sanctioned Iranian entities involved. The deal represented Iran's most significant arms export in decades and established a strategic arms-supply partnership with Russia.
Iran's nuclear threshold capability combined with its proxy network makes it the most destabilising regional actor in the Middle East. Nuclear weaponisation would trigger a regional proliferation cascade (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey are all threshold candidates). Iran's demonstrated willingness to conduct direct strikes on Israel has fundamentally changed Middle Eastern deterrence dynamics.