Hamas — Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades
Hamas — Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades
Non-state armed group; designated terrorist organisation (US, EU, UK); demonstrated mass-casualty attack capability; Iran-backed; part of the Axis of Resistance
Source: SIPRI / IISS / CRS
Hamas's Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades executed the October 7, 2023 attack — the deadliest terrorist attack since 9/11 and the largest single-day killing of Jews since the Holocaust — demonstrating sophisticated operational planning, combined arms execution, and intelligence penetration of Israeli defences. Hamas possesses an extensive rocket arsenal, underground tunnel network, and increasingly capable long-range missiles supplied by Iran. Israel's 2023–2024 Gaza campaign has significantly degraded Hamas but failed to eliminate its command structure.
The October 7 attack revealed Hamas as a more capable military organisation than previously assessed by Israeli intelligence. The operation involved ~3,000 fighters in a multi-axis assault, breaching the Gaza fence at 29 points, employing motor gliders, motorcycles, and bulldozers, and demonstrating detailed foreknowledge of IDF base layouts. Despite severe attrition from 15+ months of Israeli ground operations, Hamas has maintained a functional command structure and continued rocket fire throughout. Senior leader Yahya Sinwar was killed October 2024.
Hamas draws on Palestinian nationalist grievance, Muslim Brotherhood Sunni Islamist ideology, and resistance narrative. Governance of Gaza since 2007 provides organisational base. October 7 demonstrated Hamas's willingness to accept catastrophic civilian costs for a moment of strategic breakthrough. Political survival — not military victory — is the immediate objective.
Palestinian political leadership (challenge to Fatah/PA), symbolic leadership of global Islamic solidarity for Palestine, normative legitimacy as resistance force.
Qassam (5–10 km), M-75 (75 km), M-302 (160 km), R-160, Iranian-supplied Fajr-5. Significant portion depleted; production capability in Gaza severely degraded.
"Gaza Metro" — hundreds of km of tunnels at 20–80m depth. Command, logistics, weapon storage. IDF tunnel destruction ongoing; estimated 40% destroyed as of late 2024.
Urban warfare expertise. Anti-tank capabilities (RPG-29, Kornet). IED networks. Extensive booby-trapping. Asymmetric attrition against conventional forces.
October 7 demonstrated motor gliders, motorcycles, bulldozers, naval infiltration, paragliders — unprecedented multi-domain coordination for non-state actor.
October 7 maintained operational secrecy despite Israeli intelligence penetration of Gaza. Strict cell structure. Extensive use of couriers and offline communication.
Kornet ATGM, RPG-29, al-Yasin 105 rocket-propelled munition. Effective against Merkava MBTs in Gaza urban terrain. IED anti-armour specialisation.
| System | Type | Range | Payload | Guidance | CEP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qassam rocket series (1–4) | Unguided artillery rocket | 3–25 km (Qassam-4) | 0.5–10 kg | None — area weapon | N/A |
| M-75 / J-80 | Unguided artillery rocket | 75–80 km | ~90 kg | None — area weapon | N/A |
| R-160 (improved guidance) | Guided artillery rocket | ~160 km | ~90 kg | GPS-aided guidance system installed | ~100 m |
| Sejil ATGM (Kornet copy) | Anti-tank guided missile | 5 km | Dual tandem warhead (>1,000 mm penetration) | Laser beam riding | ~0.5 m |
Small commercially-derived platform. Used for reconnaissance before Oct 7 attacks to plan assault routes.
Iranian Qasef-1 derivative. Limited stockpile. Most destroyed in IDF operations.
Minimal traditional EW capability. Limited GPS jamming equipment. Cyber capabilities used for information operations rather than military EW.
HUMINT network throughout Gaza providing targeting intelligence. Social media and Israeli civilian communication monitoring for operational intelligence.
Limited — primarily commercially available radio frequency equipment and electronic countermeasures. Assessment: near-zero meaningful military EW capability.
Operation Al-Aqsa Flood — largest Palestinian armed attack on Israel in history. 1,200 Israelis killed, 251 taken hostage. Demonstrated sophisticated multi-axis assault planning capability. Triggered full-scale Israeli military response (Operation Iron Swords).
Yahya Sinwar killed by IDF forces in Rafah. Primary military architect of October 7 and most significant Hamas operational commander. Replaced by Muhammad Sinwar (brother) and collective leadership.
Phase 1 ceasefire agreement. Hostage releases began — initial exchange of 33 Israeli hostages for ~1,900 Palestinian prisoners. IDF partial withdrawal from central Gaza. Hamas preserved political structure.
Hamas military wing assessed as severely degraded: ~17,000+ fighters killed (IDF estimate), most brigade-level commanders dead, tunnel network ~60% destroyed. Political wing in Qatar attempting to negotiate Phase 2.
IDF resumed operations in Gaza after Phase 2 negotiations stalled. Hamas facing dual pressure: hostages still held, political legitimacy in Gaza contested, military wing attempting reconstitution in limited areas.
Hamas political wing will prioritise hostage negotiations from a position of political survival. Military wing is attempting limited reconstitution in areas of reduced IDF presence. Priority is preserving organisational survival rather than any military initiative.
Hamas will attempt to reassert governance of Gaza if a ceasefire is reached. Military capability will take years to rebuild. The critical question is whether Egypt-Rafah crossing smuggling routes can be reopened. If IDF maintains presence in the Philadelphi Corridor, Hamas re-arming is severely constrained.
COA 1: Continue ceasefire negotiations, maximise political survival as priority over military reconstitution.
COA 2: If Phase 2 collapses and IDF resumes full-scale operations, Hamas accepts further attrition while maintaining symbolic resistance narrative.
COA 3: Attempt to use Gaza civilian suffering as diplomatic weapon to force international pressure on Israel.
Political wing in Qatar (Haniyeh successor Yahya Sinwar's brother; political bureau chief) separated from military wing in Gaza. Fracture between political and military leadership increasing. Palestinian Authority in West Bank offers alternative legitimacy.
Severely degraded. Brigade-level command destroyed. Heavy weapons mostly eliminated. Tunnel network ~60% destroyed. ~17,000+ fighters killed. Reorganising into smaller cell-based units.
Gaza economy destroyed. Hamas funding from Qatar (~$30M/month pre-war) suspended. Iran weapons supply significantly disrupted. Crypto fundraising and diaspora donations provide limited support.
Gaza civilian population experiencing catastrophic humanitarian conditions. Some Hamas support degraded by civilian casualties caused by their tactics. However, resistance narrative maintains support base despite suffering.
Al-Aqsa TV network and social media propaganda maintaining narrative. Global pro-Palestinian movement provides unprecedented international sympathy. Civilian casualty imagery used as primary information weapon.
Gaza infrastructure largely destroyed. IDF control of Philadelphi Corridor (Egyptian border) critically constraining tunnel-based resupply. Hospitals, water, power, roads heavily damaged.
Gaza Strip (365 km², ~2.3M population) is one of the world's most densely populated territories. Urban terrain provides military advantage against conventional forces. Tunnel network (despite destruction) still provides some protection.
Hamas has demonstrated the ability to sustain operations through multiple prolonged campaigns (2008, 2012, 2014, 2021, 2023-25). Each ceasefire allows reconstitution. Time works for Hamas if it can preserve organisational core.
Organisational survival and political narrative as resistance movement — even a militarily defeated Hamas retains political legitimacy as long as Palestinian statehood remains unresolved.
Political Bureau (Qatar — Ismail Haniyeh killed July 2024, successor Yahya Sinwar killed October 2024; new leadership TBC) separated from Military Wing (Gaza — severely degraded). Growing fracture between political survival instincts of Qatar bureau and military hardliners in Gaza.
Hamas prioritises organisational survival and political coercion over military victory. The October 7, 2023 attack demonstrated sophisticated planning and combined-arms execution, but the strategic goal was to trigger an Israeli response that would rally international opinion and break normalisation trends. Tunnel infrastructure survivability-proofs Hamas against Israeli air power and is the primary military enabler.
No formal A2/AD — relies on tunnel protection, civilian co-location, and international pressure to constrain adversary operations. Urban terrain as force equaliser. RPG/ATGM saturation to attrit armoured vehicles in close urban combat.
Hamas primarily threatens NATO partner Israel rather than Alliance territory. The October 7 attack triggered regional escalation with Article 5-relevant pathways (Iranian direct attack, Hezbollah northern front). Hamas survival limits Israeli ability to normalise with Arab states, maintaining chronic regional instability that draws US and Allied resources.
Underground manufacturing capability for Qassam and M-75 rockets. IDF operations have destroyed assessed majority of production infrastructure. Some capability remains.
Tunnel construction continues even during active IDF operations. Key strategic asset. Full neutralisation requires multi-year IDF presence assessed as politically unsustainable.
Yahya Sinwar killed October 2024. Remaining Shura Council in Qatar/Lebanon directing organisation. Military wing command dispersed in tunnels.
Hamas operated extensive tunnel-based workshops producing Qassam rockets, mortar rounds, anti-armour systems, and IEDs. Israeli forces documented and destroyed significant tunnel manufacturing infrastructure during the 2023–2024 Gaza ground campaign. Ability to reconstitute rocket production is severely constrained by IDF operations, blockade, and loss of trained engineers. Remaining rocket stockpile was estimated by IDF at 8,000–14,000 after the opening salvo.
Israeli and US intelligence indicated Iran provided Hamas with funding, explosives, and anti-armour weapons, with Hamas military receiving an estimated $100M+ annually from Iran. Iran denied operational planning involvement but praised the October 7 attack. The extent of Iranian operational versus material support is assessed differently across intelligence agencies. The attacks demonstrated sophisticated planning and combined-arms execution consistent with Iranian training and advisory support.
Prior to October 7, 2023, Hamas had accumulated a rocket stockpile including Iranian-supplied M-75 (~75 km range) and J-80 (~80 km) rockets. Iranian supply ran via Sudan and Egyptian Sinai smuggling networks. An Iranian vessel (MV Klos-C) was intercepted in 2014 carrying M-302 rockets bound for Gaza. The October 7 opening salvo of ~3,000 rockets in 20 minutes reflected years of accumulated Iranian-supplied and domestically produced stockpile.
Hamas's October 7 attack demonstrated that a relatively small non-state actor can precipitate a major regional conflict with global implications. Hamas's survival in any form prevents Israeli normalization with Arab states (particularly Saudi Arabia). The Gaza war has created a global political fracture and generated the largest international protest movements since Iraq 2003.