People's Republic of China
People's Republic of China
Systemic challenge; growing threat to Euro-Atlantic security
Source: SIPRI / IISS / CRS
China is undergoing the most comprehensive military modernisation in its history. The PLA is expanding its nuclear arsenal rapidly, fielding advanced air, naval, space, cyber, and counter-space capabilities, and sustaining the world's second-largest military budget. NATO has identified China as a systemic challenge whose stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge Allied interests.
China's nuclear arsenal is expanding at an unprecedented pace. FAS estimated roughly 600 Chinese nuclear warheads in 2025, and SIPRI assessed Chinese military spending at $336bn in 2025 after a 31st consecutive annual increase. The PLA Navy remains the largest by hull count globally, while China continues closing the capability gap with the US across most conventional domains.
CCP legitimacy is rooted in the narrative of restoring China's greatness after the "century of humiliation." Xi Jinping has personally tied Taiwan reunification to his political legacy. Third-term consolidation removes transition pressure but removes accountability mechanisms. The Taiwan issue is non-negotiable within CCP politics — any leader seen as soft faces existential political risk.
Control of the first and second island chains, treating the South China Sea as internal territorial waters (nine-dash line), domination of ASEAN economic relationships, expansion of Indian Ocean access through Belt and Road port infrastructure (Gwadar, Hambantota, Djibouti), and eventual displacement of US extended deterrence in Northeast Asia.
Arsenal expanding rapidly. FAS estimated about 600 warheads in 2025, with construction of three new ICBM silo fields complete and a small deployed subset. DoD projections still point toward ~1,500 by 2035.
World's largest standing army. Significant modernisation underway. Reducing size but increasing quality.
J-20 stealth fighter operational. J-31 carrier variant in development. Rapidly closing gap with US air power.
Largest navy by hull count. Third carrier operational. Type 055 destroyer world-class. Expanding SSBN force.
Extensive state cyber operations (APT40, APT41). Strategic information dominance doctrine. Active global espionage.
Most sophisticated A2/AD complex in the world. DF-21D/DF-26 carrier-killer missiles. Extensive ISR and long-range strike.
Second only to US in space assets. Anti-satellite weapons tested. BeiDou navigation system global. Directed energy programs.
| System | Type | Range | Payload | Guidance | CEP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod 4) | Anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) | ~1,500 km | ~500 kg manoeuvring re-entry vehicle | Terminal IR seeker + inertial + over-the-horizon radar | Est. 20–50 m (contested) |
| DF-26 (CSS-18) | Intermediate-range ballistic missile (ASBM/IRBM) | ~4,000 km | Dual conventional/nuclear MaRV | Advanced inertial + terminal | Classified |
| YJ-12 (Eagle Strike 12) | Anti-ship cruise missile | ~400 km | ~300 kg | Active radar + passive IR terminal | <10 m |
| CJ-10 / DH-10 | Ground-launched cruise missile | ~2,000 km | 500 kg | INS + TERCOM + optical | ~10 m |
| PL-15 BVRAAM | Air-to-air beyond-visual-range missile | 200+ km | N/A (kinetic) | Active radar homing + MICA data link | N/A |
Primary MALE platform. 6 hardpoints, 480 kg payload. Comparable to MQ-9 Reaper class.
Comparable to RQ-4 Global Hawk in concept. Regularly observed in surveillance patterns around Taiwan.
Exported to multiple countries. Represents PLAAF's growing precision loitering capability.
Electromagnetic catapult launch system; J-35A 5th-gen carrier integration underway; 2 CATOBAR carriers by 2026 projected
Game-changing capability that significantly expands PLAN strike reach beyond first island chain.
12,000 tons; 112 VLS cells; comprehensive air defence, anti-ship, and land-attack capability
Most capable surface combatant in the Indo-Pacific outside US Navy. Comparable to Ticonderoga-class cruiser.
Range 1,500 km; terminal manoeuvring re-entry vehicle; see missiles section
Used to create A2/AD bubble denying US carrier access within first island chain.
6 boats; 12× JL-2 SLBMs per boat; range ~7,200 km; limited access to Pacific patrols
Credible sea-based nuclear deterrent developing. Access to open ocean constrained by first island chain geography.
BM/KG300G podded EW jammer for carrier-based aircraft degrades enemy AWACS and datalinks. Active phased array jammers on Type 052D/055 destroyers. Ground-based long-range jamming systems targeting Taiwan communications infrastructure.
Constellation of ELINT satellites provides real-time tracking of US naval movements. Ground stations in western Pacific provide persistent ISR. TJ-2 SIGINT aircraft (SIGINT variant of Tu-154). Rapidly expanding space-based ISR constellation (>500 reconnaissance satellites).
YLC-8B VHF counter-stealth radar (detects F-22/F-35 class). DZ-1000 directed energy against satellite-based ISR. PLAAF ECM pods on H-6 bombers. BeiDou-based precision weapons guidance independent of GPS. Space-based HEL directed energy EW (experimental). Assessment: advancing rapidly, approaching world-class in key areas.
PLA conducted "Joint Sword-2024B" encirclement exercises around Taiwan — third major exercise since 2022, largest in scale, including simulated blockade rehearsal and precision strike coordination.
PLAN commissioned Type 076 amphibious assault ship, the first Chinese assault ship capable of catapult-launched fixed-wing aircraft operations, marking a step-change in amphibious power projection.
China's official defence budget increased 7.2% to ~$245Bn. Actual spending estimated at 1.5–2× official figures due to off-budget procurement and R&D programmes.
J-35A stealth multirole fighter began carrier integration trials on Fujian (Type 003 CATOBAR carrier), advancing China's 5th-gen carrier aviation capability ahead of projected 2026 IOC.
Three PLAN carrier strike groups conducted simultaneous exercises in the South China Sea, Pacific, and Indian Ocean — first confirmed tri-carrier exercise, demonstrating expanded operational reach.
China-Philippines confrontation in Spratly Islands escalated; coast guard water cannon attacks on Philippine supply vessels at Second Thomas Shoal. US-Philippines Mutual Defence Treaty implications triggered diplomatic exchanges.
Chinese naval and air forces conducted combat-readiness patrols near Scarborough Shoal during Balikatan exercises involving the Philippines, US, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and France.
China and the Philippines traded accusations over Sandy Cay after Beijing alleged Philippine landings and Manila threatened to drive away Chinese vessels it said were conducting illegal research.
Grey-zone pressure on Taiwan and South China Sea claimants will continue through coast guard operations, maritime militia activity, and air incursions into the Taiwan ADIZ. No kinetic action is assessed as imminent. J-35A carrier integration and Type 076 amphibious capability development remain the key near-term military milestones.
J-35A carrier aviation reaching IOC (assessed 2026) will significantly advance PLAN strike capability. PLA exercises will become more operationally sophisticated, rehearsing blockade and beach assault scenarios. Risk of accidental escalation at Second Thomas Shoal or in Senkaku waters elevated if coast guard contacts continue. The 2027 PLA centenary represents a self-imposed political deadline that Xi may feel compelled to demonstrate progress toward.
: Continued grey-zone pressure and exercises to exhaust Taiwan's resolve and probe US alliance commitments without triggering direct conflict.
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: Cross-strait invasion scenario becomes live if Xi assesses the strategic window is closing (US military superiority eroding, Taiwan not moving toward reunification).
Xi has consolidated unprecedented personal control over military, party, and state. CMC reporting lines run directly to Xi. Third term normalised. Belt and Road operates across 140+ countries as political influence instrument. Taiwan policy is locked-in — no CCP figure can publicly soften it.
World's largest navy by hull count (~355 battle-force ships). Second-largest defence budget. Rapidly modernising across all domains — 5th-gen aviation, carrier aviation, hypersonic missiles, space/counter-space. Critical gap: no combat experience since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war.
World's second-largest economy. Structural vulnerabilities: property sector crisis (Evergrande fallout), youth unemployment (~20%), demographic decline. Economic leverage (export controls on rare earths, rare earth processing) used actively as coercive tool.
Rising nationalism, especially on Taiwan. Wolf warrior diplomacy reflects domestic audience pressure as much as foreign policy. CCP social contract based on prosperity delivery — stalling growth creates internal pressure. Xinjiang and Tibet policies create international reputational liabilities.
State-directed influence operations (50-cent army, CGTN, Xinhua). Coordinated social media campaigns targeting Taiwan society, diaspora communities, and Western public opinion. TikTok/ByteDance as potential information environment access tool (disputed/contested).
BRI ports in strategic choke points provide access to Indian Ocean and Mediterranean. Space programme expanding rapidly — BeiDou GPS alternative fully operational. Quantum communications investments targeting secure government communications.
Geographic buffer of Tibetan plateau. South China Sea island chain fortification creates contested maritime space. Taiwan Strait (180 km width) is the critical operational challenge for any cross-strait operation.
China benefits from time as military capabilities and technological self-sufficiency grow. The 2027–2035 window is assessed by US DoD as the highest-risk period for Taiwan. Export controls on advanced semiconductors create urgency on self-sufficiency timeline.
Integrated national power — economic leverage, the world's largest conventional military, nuclear deterrent, political will, and near self-sufficiency in conventional weapons production.
Tight CMC control under Xi. Five theater commands cover Pacific (Eastern/Southern), Western (Tibet/Xinjiang), Northern (Korea/Russia border), Central, and a reserve. PLAN, PLAAF, and Rocket Force all report through CMC. No proxy structure — China operates through direct state channels.
PLA doctrine targets the adversary's operational system — not its forces piecemeal. 'Systems destruction warfare' identifies critical network nodes (C2, ISR, logistics) and attacks them simultaneously across all domains before kinetic engagement. The objective is to render opposing forces blind and paralysed. The PLA has specifically trained and equipped for a Taiwan contingency as the primary case.
The most extensive A2/AD system globally after Russia. Anti-Access: DF-26 (5,000 km) denies carrier operations in the Western Pacific. Area Denial: DF-21D, Type 093B submarines, J-10C/16 fighters inside the First Island Chain. HQ-9B SAMs on Spratly Island artificial islands extend IADF into the SCS.
China does not directly threaten NATO territory but threatens Allied partners (Taiwan, Japan, Philippines), US carrier operations, and — via Volt Typhoon cyber pre-positioning — NATO critical infrastructure. Beijing is the long-term pacing challenge for the Alliance. Technology competition and economic leverage affect Alliance cohesion.
No-first-use policy declared. Minimum deterrence shifting toward assured retaliation posture. Rapid expansion suggests possible doctrinal evolution.
Next-generation stealth strategic bomber. Will give China true intercontinental reach. Expected to extend nuclear triad.
Next-generation ballistic missile submarine. Will carry JL-3 SLBM with extended range.
5th-generation carrier-based fighter. Will equip Fujian and future carriers.
New intermediate-range ballistic missile. Hypersonic glide vehicle capability reported.
Hungary's deepening military and economic ties with China have raised NATO concerns. Reports in 2024 indicated Hungarian discussions on Chinese air defence systems and military communication equipment. While no confirmed procurement agreement has been publicly disclosed, Hungary's construction of a CATL battery gigafactory and BYD assembly plant, alongside close political ties between Orbán and Beijing, have positioned Hungary as a potential entry point for Chinese military technology into the NATO alliance.
The Type 003 Fujian — China's third and most advanced aircraft carrier — completed sea trials in 2024 and is expected to achieve initial operational capability in 2025–2026. It is the first non-US aircraft carrier equipped with electromagnetic catapult launch (EALS, equivalent to EMALS), enabling operations of the J-15T carrier fighter with heavier weapons loads. The Fujian represents a step-change in Chinese carrier aviation capability, and DoD assesses a fourth carrier (possibly nuclear-powered) is in the design phase.
Despite China's stated goal of engine self-sufficiency, Russia continues to supply AL-31F and AL-41F1 turbofan engines for Chinese Su-35 and some J-20 test aircraft. China's domestically developed WS-10C and WS-15 engines have not yet fully replaced Russian imports for high-performance fighters. The dependency is strategically significant: Russian supply constraints or political decisions could affect PLAAF readiness. China is accelerating WS-15 development to eliminate this vulnerability.
China has supplied Wing Loong II (export: CAIG Wing Loong II) and CH-4B armed UAVs to Saudi Arabia for use in the Yemen conflict. Saudi Arabia is China's largest drone export customer. The Wing Loong II, comparable to the US MQ-9 Reaper in concept, carries precision-guided munitions and has been used by Saudi-led coalition forces against Houthi targets. China has also established a joint drone manufacturing facility in Saudi Arabia under Vision 2030 defence cooperation.
Pakistan Air Force received its first batch of 26 JF-17 Thunder Block III multirole fighters in early 2023, featuring an AESA radar, inflight refuelling probe, and compatibility with PL-15 beyond-visual-range missiles. The Block III represents a generational improvement over earlier variants. The JF-17 programme is the most significant active Chinese military aircraft export. Pakistan plans to eventually operate a fleet exceeding 100 aircraft across all blocks.
Serbia received a Chinese FK-3 medium-range air defence system in April 2022, delivered via six PLAAF Y-20 heavy transport aircraft in a politically significant airlift — the first Chinese military transport flight into a European country. The acquisition drew significant EU and NATO concern about Chinese military presence at Europe's borders. The FK-3 provides Serbia with a surface-to-air missile capability superior to Russia's previous Buk-M1 transfers. China positioned the sale as an example of 'comprehensive strategic partnership' with Serbia.
China is the only state with the combined economic, military, and technological capacity to structurally challenge US global leadership and reshape the international order. A forced Taiwan reunification would fundamentally alter Indo-Pacific security architecture, potentially end US extended deterrence credibility in Asia, and cut off the world's most advanced semiconductor manufacturing (TSMC).